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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This court has jurisdiction under Utah Code§ 78A-4-103(2)(j), the case
having been transferred to this Court from the Utah Supreme Court. The
Utah Supreme Court had original appellate jurisdiction under Utah Code §
78A-3-102(3)(f) and transferred the case under Utah Code§ 78A-3-102(4).
~

ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Proximate Cause Issue Not Preserved Below

The Trues argue that the district court should have reached a different
result by applying the proximate cause standard from Barneck v. Utah

Department of Transportation, 2015 UT 50, ,I 8, 353 P.3d 140, instead of the
pre-Barnecli "but for" standard. The Trues concede the issue was not
preserved below. But the Trues had more than a year to raise the issue
lj

below. They have not explained why they did not raise the issue despite
having ample time to do so. And they do not cite the exception to the
preservation rule or analyze why this case might qualify for this narrow
exception.
Should this Court decline consideration of this issue? In the
alternative, if this Court considers the issue, can the district court be

vi

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

affirmed-on the alternative ground that the result would have been the same
under the proximate cause standard?

Standard of review:
Whether an issue has been preserved, and whether this Court exercises
its discretion to find that a party qualifies for an exception to the
preservation rule are both issues unique to the appeal and do not implicate
any review of a district court ruling.
The alternate inquiry, whether summary judgment was correctly
granted, is conducted de novo. See Barneck, 2015 UT 50 at iJ 8.

Preservation:
This issue was not preserved below, even though the Trues had more
than a year to raise the issue between the time Barneck issued and final
judgment was entered. Though acknowledging that the issue was not
preserved, the Trues omit the crucial fact that they had more than a year to
do so. Further, the Trues do not cite the exception to the preservation rule or
analyze why this case might qualify for this limited exception.
"When a party raises an issue on appeal without having properly
preserved the issue below, [this Court] requires that the party articulate an
2
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appropriate justification for appellate review; specifically, the party must
~

argue either plain error or exceptional circumstances." Salt Lake Cnty. v.
Butler, Crocliett & Walsh Dev. Corp., 2013 UT App 30, ,1 33, 297 P.3d 38
(emphasis added); see also Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A), (B) (requiring an
appellant's brief to contain a "citation to the record showing that the issue
was preserved in the trial court" or "a statement of grounds for seeking
review of an issue not preserved in the trial court").

2. Formal, official acts
To qualify for permit immunity, a government entity must show that it

...,

had authority to authorize private party conduct and that it did so with a
formal act. The undisputed record evidence showed that all of UDOT's
conduct - including any negligent omissions - were part of the ongoing

v)

permitting process. This process was authorized by statute, concerned
private activity, and culminated in a formal, written document with
numerous detailed terms outlining the private party's obligations under the
permit. Is this sufficient formality for the permit exception to apply?

3
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Standard of review:
Whether summary judgment was correctly granted is a de nova
inquiry. See Barneck, 2015 UT 50 at ,r 8.

Preservation:
This issue was preserved in UDOT's motion for summary judgment,
and supporting memoranda, and addressed by the district court in its grant
of summary judgment. R. 1014-20, 1136-37.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES AND RULES
Any determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are
set forth in the body of the brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case:
This is an immunity case arising out of a traffic accident at a
construction site on a state road. The district court concluded that UDOT,
4
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which was involved with the construction only in a regulatory capacity over a
private construction company, was entitled to immunity. The intersection
where the accident occurred was safe before the construction project. Unsafe
conditions arose during construction. UDOT was unaware of the unsafe
conditions. UDOT did not perform the construction and the construction was
not for UDOT's benefit - a municipality had hired a private construction
company to install a water line under a state road. The undisputed evidence
showed that UDOT's involvement was only in the issuance of a permit
(pursuant to statute) to allow the private company to excavate, and in
UDOT's ongoing regulatory oversight (also pursuant to statute) of the permit.
There was no evidence that UDOT became aware of an unsafe condition at
the intersection, either in its regulatory capacity or in the normal course of
its routine maintenance and care of the road.
01

This case is also about an intervening change in law and the Trues'
failure to preserve that issue despite having thirteen months to do so before
final judgment entered. The parties had briefed and argued the immunity
question based on the then-governing "but for" standard. The district court
verbally ruled under that standard. The next day, the standard changed
when the Utah Supreme Court replaced the "but for" standard with a
proximate cause standard. See Barneck, 2015 UT 50 at ,r 38. UDOT
5
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promptly notified the district court and other parties of Barn~~li, maintai~ing
that it did not affect the result, and asking for an opportunity to brief the
issue if the district court revisited its ruling. In the forty days that passed
before the verbal ruling was reduced to a written ruling, and in the additional
year that passed before final judgment was entered, the Trues never asked
the court to revisit its ruling and never argued that the result would have
been different under the new Barnecli standard. The Trues now raise the
issue for the first time without explaining why they did not preserve the issue
below and without citing, discussing, or analyzing the case law governing the
limited exception to the preservation rule.

Course of proceedings:
The Trues brought this lawsuit to recover for the injuries they suffered
in a collision. R. 87-88; see also R. 84-108. They sued UDOT; Kristi Oleson,
the driver of the truck that struck them; ABC, the general contractor hired by
Ogden City to install the water line beneath the intersection where the
accident occurred; and CHN, a subcontractor hired by ABC for the project.
UDOT filed a motion for summary judgment based on permit immunity
under the then-governing pre-Barneck "but for" standard. R. 1004-1054;
1129-37. Oral argument on the motion was held June 11, 2015, at the
6
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conclusion of which the district court verbally granted the motion. R. 1141,
\1)

1270-74. The Court asked UDOT to prepare a proposed order and include a
signature line for the Trues' counsel for approval as to form. R. 1272, 127 4.
The next day, June 12, the Utah Supreme Court issued Barneck, adopting a
proximate cause standard for determining when immunity applies and
repudiating the "but for" standard. See Barneck, 2015 UT 50 at ,I 38. On
June 16, UDOT notified the district court and the parties of Barneck and
asked for an opportunity to brief the issue if the court revisited it. See
Addendum 1. 1
UDOT's counsel requested a recording of the hearing to assist with the
accurate preparation of the proposed order. Once the recording was received,
UDOT's counsel prepared a proposed order and circulated it on July 2 to the
Trues' counsel. This order was consistent with the pre-Barneck briefing,
argument, and ruling. While UDOT's counsel awaited a response from the
True's counsel on approval as to form, the court sent out a notice on July 22,
reminding UDOT that a proposed order had not yet been received, and

1 UDOT's

June 16th letter was sent to the district court, to the True's counsel, and
to co-defendant's counsel, Joseph J. Joyce. Inexplicably, the letter is missing from
the record below. UDOT recovered a copy of this letter from Mr. Joyce. It is this
copy, bearing a receipt stamp dated June 18, 2015 from Mr. Joyce's office, that
appears in Addendum 1.

7

'-.d

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

.

.

advising UDOT that any pending rulings would be dismissed if a proposed
order was not submitted within thirty days. R. 1145. The next day, UDOT
followed up with Trues' counsel to secure approval as to form for the proposed
order. The Trues' counsel approved the order as to form on July 27, and
UDOT filed the proposed order with the district court the same day. R. 114754. The district court signed the proposed order on July 29. R. 1155. In the
forty days that elapsed between the time the district court announced its
ruling and the time it signed the written order, the Trues did not ask the
district court to revisit its verbal ruling in light of Barneck.
Other defendants still had unresolved claims against them, so the
grant of summary judgment to UDOT did not conclude the case below. The

~

case remained pending for another year until the Trues settled the case with
the other defendants and a final judgment as to all parties and all claims was
entered on July 20, 2016. R. 1198. During that year, the Trues still did not
raise Barneck with the district court or otherwise seek reconsideration of the
court's grant of summary judgment to UDOT.
The Trues now appeal, raising Barneck for the first time. They have
not explained their failure to preserve the issue, despite having over a year to
do so, or why they should be relieved of their duty to preserve the issue.

8
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Disposition below:
The district court granted summary judgment to UDOT. R. 155-62.
The district court concluded that inspection immunity applied. R. 1160. The
district court also concluded that permit immunity applied. Id.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the summer of 2009, Thomas True and his wife, Melissa True, were
riding a motorcycle in Ogden, Utah. R. 86-87. As they rode through the
intersection of 1900 West and Midland Drive, they were struck by a truck
driven by Kristi Oleson. R. 87. The Trues brought this lawsuit to recover for
the injuries they suffered in this collision. R. 87-88; see also R. 84-108.
The intersection was under construction at the time, not by UDOT but
by ABC and its subcontractor, CHN. R. 90, 1024, 1025. ABC had been hired
as the general contractor to install a water line for Ogden City that went
under the intersection. R. 1024. CHN was hired by ABC as a subcontractor
to bore beneath railroad tracks at the intersection. R. 1025. The project was
not completed by UDOT, nor for UDOT's benefit; UDOT was involved only
because the project involved construction by a third party on a state right of
way, requiring a permit. R. 1026, 1033.

v}

9
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Because the project involved "digging or excavating within the right-ofway of [a] state highway," ABC was required by Utah Code§ 72-7-102 to first
obtain a permit from UDOT before construction could take place. R. 1026,
1033. As part of the permitting process, ABC was required to submit an

~

approved traffic control plan. R. 1026, 1027, 1028, 1036-38, 1040. Following
ABC's permit application, including the submission of an approved traffic
control plan, UDOT issued ABC a permit. R. 1026-27, 1039-40, 1042.
The permit granted ABC permission to encroach on UDOT's state
highway, specifically identifying the what, when, and where of ABC's
authorization. R. 1042. The permit provided that "[a]n inspector may be
required at permittee's expense." Id. And it provided that "Permittee shall
not perform any work on State Highway right of way beyond those areas of
operation stipulated in this permit." Id. The permit provided that
permittee's failure to "comply with [UDOT] regulations, specifications, or
instructions pertinent to this permit" may result in a "verbal order" from
UDOT to "suspend the work until the violation is corrected." Id.
Furthermore, the permit provided, permittee's failure to comply to such a
verbal order could result in UDOT issuing a "written order stopping all or
any part of the work." Id.

10

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

UDOT transportation technician John Bangle was assigned by UDOT
to make inspections of the construction project, as outlined in the permit. R.
1050-54. Specifically, he "inspected operations of the construction crew, what
they were doing to our right-of-way," and "I made sure that our requirements
were met as far as placement of the road and compaction and things like
that. They were disturbing our right-of-way, putting a waterline in, to make
sure they put it back correctly." R. 1051. In addition, he "inspected the
traffic control" - including inspecting the traffic "devices, a general over look
at were they placed, like, in the right places, where's the traffic control plan."
R. 1052. Bangle was not available to constantly monitor the construction site
or even inspect the site every day, due to other permits he was assigned to
monitor. R. 1051-52.
On the day of the accident, CHN had completed the boring beneath the
i,,,l
\a;fJI

intersection and was tying the water line. R. 1032. The Trues assert that a
temporary no-left-turn sign had been removed from the intersection on the
day of the accident. R. 1242. The Trues assert that UDOT negligently failed
to inspect the construction site and thereby failed to notice the removal of the
no-left-turn sign and other dangerous conditions at the site. R. 1241-42
(True's counsel stating that "UDOT negligently supervised others at the
scene and allowed that 'No left turn' si[gn] to be removed. I think that those
11
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are - those are really negligent acts of omission, if anything. They'1:e nonactions, really."); R. 1242 (True's counsel stating that they don't necessarily
challenge the traffic control plan itself, but "that it all came down to that no
left turn signal and some other things that an inspector should have picked
up on").

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should not consider the Trues' Barnec/:1, argument because
they failed to preserve it below, even though they had thirteen months to do
so. And they have not explained why they failed to preserve the issue, nor
cited, discussed, or analyzed why they might qualify for an exception to the
preservation rule.
Even if this Court were to consider the Trues' unpreserved argument,
the undisputed record evidence shows that UDOT is entitled to immunity
under Barneck's proximate cause standard. All of UDOT's purported
negligence occurred in its regulatory capacity over private parties. UDOT is
entitled to immunity because all of the conduct complained of, including
omissions, occurred in this immunity-invoking condition - UDOT's regulatory
authority to issue and administer the permit.
And UDOT's issuance and administration of the permit constitutes a
formal, official act for which permit immunity applies. UDOT's regulatory

12
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authority to issue and administer the permit is conferred by statute. And the
permit itself is a written, detailed, contract-like document that is formal in
nature.

ARGUMENT
1. This Court should not consider the True's unpreserved argument;

in any event, this argument does not justify reversal.
Because the Trues have not preserved their Barneck argument, nor
i.;P

stated why they qualify for an exception to the preservation rule, this Court
should decline to consider it. In any event, this argument does not justify
reversal.

A. The Trues failed to preserve their Barneck proximate cause
argument.
~

Because the Trues have not preserved their Barneck argument, nor
stated why they qualify for an exception to the preservation rule, this Court
should decline to consider it. The Trues simply do not address why they
failed to preserve the issue. They have not cited or analyzed the case law
governing the exception to the preservation rule. Instead they simply state
that Barneck was not issued until after the district court's ruling. Aplt. Brf.
at 1. The Trues do not state why they did not inject the issue into the

13
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proceedings below, either in the forty days between the verbal ruling and
written order, or in the additional year that passed before the remaining
defenda nts were dismissed and final judgment as to all parties was entered.
An appellate court "generally do[es] not address unpreserved
arguments raised for the first time on appeal." Gowe v. Intermountain

Healthcare, Inc. , 2015 UT App 105, ,i 7, 356 P.3d 683 (citing Jacob v. Bezzant,
2009 UT 37,

ii 34, 212 P.3d 535). "To preserve an argument for appellate

review, the appellant must first present the argument to the district court 'in
such a way that the court has an opportunity to rule on [it]."' Gowe, 2015 UT
App 105 at ,i 7 (quoting Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ,i 12, 266 P.3d
828) . The issue must be "specifically raised, in a timely manner, and must be
supported by evidence and relevant legal authority." Donjuan v. McDermott,
2011 UT 72,

ii 20, 266 P.3d 839 (citing O'Dea v. Olea, 2009 UT 46, ii 18, 217

P.3d 704).
The preservation requirement "puts the trial judge on notice of the
asserted error and allows for correction at that time in the course of the
proceeding."' PC Crane Serv., LLC v. McQueen Masonry, Inc., 2012 UT App
61, ,i 47, 273 P.3d 396 (quoting 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc. , 2004 UT 72,

,i 51, 99 P.3d 801). The rule allows a district court to correct an error while it
is "still easy ... to correct." PC Crane, 2012 UT App 61 at ,i 47 (quotation
14
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omitted); see also State ex rel. K.F., 2009 UT 4, ii 63, 201 P.3d 985 Gudicial ·
economy is disserved if appellate courts permitted a new argument on appeal
where the "only likely remedy is merely a remand to the trial court" for the
very remedy that the appellant waived by not raising it in the first place; in
such a case, this Court "decline[s] to offer such a remedy unless the
[appellant] first provided the trial court the opportunity to correct the error").
The Trues rely on an intervening change of law - the Barneck
decision - to support their claim of error. To be sure, Barneck changes the
standard by which immunity claims are analyzed. But at the time the
district court made its verbal ruling - and indeed, in all the litigation
preceding that ruling, including the summary judgment briefing and the
extensive discovery conducted - all parties correctly proceeded under what
was then the governing pre-Barnec/i standard.
But after Barnec/i changed that standard, the Trues had thirteen
months to raise the change of law with the district court yet failed to do so.
If, as they argue now, application of the Barneck standard would have

produced a different result, why didn't they press the point below? They did
not object to the proposed order but in fact approved it as to form. They did
not otherwise ask the district court to revisit its verbal ruling. Rather, the
Trues acquiesced to the pre-Barneck standard. Even after the written order

15
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'

issued, the Trues could have sought its "revision at any time" until the final
judgment eventually entered. See Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) ("an order ... that
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer
than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties,
and may be changed at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all
the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties"). Thus, the Trues
could have sought reconsideration of the order, if they believed, as they do
now, that Barneck changed the outcome. Yet the Trues did not. Because the
Trues had thirteen months to raise the issue with the district court, this case
hardly presents a "rare procedural anomaly or truly exceptional
circumstance" that would relieve them of their duty to preserve the issue
below. State v. Isom, 2015 UT App 160,

,r

19, 354 P.3d 791.

But more to the point, the Trues failed in their opening brief to
articulate why this case presents an exception to the preservation rule. It is
this failure that bars consideration of their unpreserved argument. The case
law mandates that an appellant "must argue" an exception for this Court to
hear an unpreserved issue: "When a party raises an issue on appeal without
having properly preserved the issue below, [this Court] requires that the
party articulate an appropriate justification for appellate review; specifically,
the party must argue either plain error or exceptional circumstances."
16
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Butler, 2013 UT App 30 at ilil 33 (emphasis added); see also Utah R. App. P.
24(a)(5)(A), (B) (requiring an appellant's brief to contain a "citation to the
record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court" or "a
~

statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial
court"). Like the appellant in Butler, the Trues do "not invoke either plain
error or exceptional circumstances." Id. at if 34. And, as in Butler, this Court
should therefore conclude that the Trues' unpreserved claim is not properly
before this Court. Id.
Even if the Trues were to articulate either plain error or exceptional
circumstances in their reply brief, this Court should nevertheless decline to
consider their unpreserved argument. Making such a showing in a reply
brief is too late. "It is well settled that issues raised by an appellant in a
reply brief that were not presented in the opening brief are considered waived
and will not be considered by the appellate court." Isom, 2015 UT App 160 at

if 16. Even in cases of plain error, invoking the exception for the first time in
a reply brief is inadequate: this Court has "consistently refused to consider
arguments of plain error raised for the first time in an appellant's reply brief,

even if the plain error argument is in response to a dispute over preservation
raised for the first time in the appellee's brief." Marcroft v. Labor Comm 'n,
2015 UT App 174, if 4, 356 P.3d 164 (citation and quotation marks omitted,
17
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emphasis added) (stating that, "[b]~cause Marc~oft's first invocation.of the·
plain error exception to our preservation requirement appears in his reply
brief, we will not consider it"); see also id. at

,r 4,

n.1 ("This is not as unfair as

it may sound. After all, the appellant bears the burden of establishing in its
opening brief where each issue was preserved for appeal, and, if an issue was
not preserved, why it should be considered anyway, such as because the plain
error doctrine applies.").
Accordingly, this Court should decline to consider the True's
unpreserved argument raised for the first time on appeal.

B. If this Court considers the Trues' unpreserved argument,
UDOT is nevertheless immune under the proximate cause
standard.
If this Court considers the Trues' unpreserved argument, UDOT is
nevertheless immune under the proximate cause standard, as set forth below.
Even without the benefit of conducting discovery under the Barneck
standard, or submitting evidence specifically under that standard, UDOT
asserts that the undisputed record evidence, coupled with the Trues'

18
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(&;

stipulations on appeal, supports a grant of summary judgment under

Barneclls proximate cause standard. 2
Barneck holds that "an immunity-invoking condition ... must be a
proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries" for immunity to apply. 2015 UT 50
at iJ 38. The undisputed record evidence showed that the permitting here
~

was not a single event, but an ongoing process - and a condition in which all
of UDOT's alleged negligence was a part. It is in this "immunity-invoking

In making this alternative argument for affirmance, UDOT does not waive what
would have been its right to pursue fact discovery and submit evidence under
Barneck's proximate cause standard. In fact, UDOT's hands are tied by having to
argue proximate cause for the first time on appeal, without the benefit of creating a
factual record to support it. In making this argument, UDOT simply argues that
this record fortuitously supports immunity under the new standard.
If this Court disagrees, it should go no further than vacating the grant of
summary judgment. This Court should not affirmatively grant the additional relief
the Trues seek - a holding that "UDOT does not have immunity under the permit
exception because Plaintiffs' injuries were not proximately caused by the issuance of
the permit." Aplt. Brf. at 14. To conclude this, where UDOT conducted discovery
and submitted evidence when a different standard governed, would be unfair and
unjust. If summary judgment is reversed, UDOT on remand should be given an
opportunity to reassess its immunity defenses under the new standard, including a
review of evidence on proximate cause that was not relevant before (but now is)
and, if necessary, the ability to pursue discovery on that factual question, as well as
file dispositive motions. Likewise, UDOT should be given an opportunity to respond
to any opposition to summary judgment filed by the Trues under the new standard.
Moreover, if the Trues would have simply raised Barneck below, UDOT could have
assessed the Trues' arguments to determine whether additional fact discovery or
additional evidence needed to be submitted to oppose the True's arguments. This
highlights the judicial efficiency of preserving issues such as this in the district
court, where discovery can take place and additional evidence can be submitted,
rather than raising new arguments on appeal, where the parties are limited to
factual record created under a different standard.
2
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condition" that all of UDOT's alleged negligence occurr~d. ·All of UDOT's
alleged negligence was part of this permitting process - and therefore it is
entitled to immunity. The undisputed evidence is that UDOT did not know of
the unsafe conditions on the day of the accident, nor did it attempt to remedy
any unsafe condition, like it did in Barnecli. UDOT's purported negligence in
failing to discover unsafe conditions at the construction site fell entirely and
only within UDOT's capacity as permit-issuer under Utah Code 72-7-102(3).
As outlined in the express terms of the permit itself, ABC's ongoing
permission was subject to revocation at any time for noncompliance with the
terms of the permit, and the construction site was subject to inspections by
UDOT (at ABC's expense) to ensure compliance. R. 1042. None of UDOT's
actions concerning pre-construction maintenance of this intersection are at
issue; indeed, the Trues conceded below that there was no evidence that the
intersection was unsafe before construction. R. 1265.
In their own words, the Trues "contend that their injuries were caused
by UDOT negligently approving an unsafe traffic control plan and then
subsequently failing to make sure the plan was carried out when others
removed the no-left-turn sign days before the collision occurred." Aplt. Brf. at
10 (see also Aplt. Brf. at 3 ("UDOT was negligent ... in particular, by failing
to approve a safe traffic control plan and failing to monitor traffic to ensure
20
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4i,

the plan was being complied with")). In other.words, ·they confend that
UDOT negligently approved the traffic control plan as part of the initial
issuance of the permit and, as part of the ongoing permitting process,
negligently failed to ensure that ABC was in compliance with the permit.
Statute provides that UDOT may "allow" construction on state roads by
permit, but that the permit "may be revoked ... for cause." Utah Code 72-7102(3). Ongoing inspection, and the potential for revocation of ABC's
permission to excavate, were express terms of the written permit UDOT
issued. ABC's permission to begin construction was expressly contingent on
compliance with the terms of the permit, including the traffic control plan.
And ABC's authorization to continue that construction was expressly
contingent on ongoing compliance with the terms of the permit. There was
no evidence that UDOT worked this construction site; the only evidence of its
involvement on this construction site was in the issuance of the permit and
periodic inspection to ensure ongoing authorization of construction under the
permit.
The approval of the traffic control plan was a part of the permitting
process. Ongoing inspection to make sure the traffic control plan was being
carried out - with its attendant potential for revocation of the authorization was also part of the UDOT's ongoing regulatory authority over ABC. By the
21

~

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

permit's express· terms, ongoing inspections - which were to be paid for by
the permittee and were to ensure compliance with all UDOT "regulations,
specifications, or instructions pertinent to this permit" - were an integral
part of ABC's ongoing authorization to continue construction once it started.
R. 1042. The Trues submitted no evidence otherwise. UDOT's inspections
and monitoring of the construction site were carried out as an integral part of
the ongoing permitting process are thus part of the "immunity-invoking
condition." Barneck, 2015 UT 50 at ,I 38. The inspections and monitoring
were carried out- negligently or otherwise - as part of, and only as part of,
UDOT's regulatory authority over ABC and are therefore immune under

Barneck.
The Trues submitted no evidence that a situation like Barneck
occurred, where UDOT knew of a dangerous condition and inadequately tried
to remedy it. There is no evidence that UDOT knew of the missing no-leftturn sign or any other unsafe condition at the construction site, or otherwise
undertook to remedy the situation, as UDOT did in Barneck. Thus, based on
the True's own stipulations on appeal, UDOT's purported negligence in
failing to inspect the construction site implicates only its regulatory capacity
as permit issuer.

22
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~

Although the Trues argued below that UDOT had an independent duty
"above and beyond issuing the permit," App. 1238, that duty was not
implicated because there is no evidence that UDOT learned of an unsafe

~

condition like they did in Barneck. UDOT is implicated here only in its role
as permit issuer and ongoing regulator, including the inspection duties set
forth in the permit as express conditions of ABC's continuing authority to
excavate. UDOT's regulatory authority over ABC continued throughout the
entire construction project, as outlined in the permit itself and expressly
authorized by the revocation provision in Utah Code§ 72-7-102. UDOT
retained regulatory authority to revoke the licensure to ensure compliance
with the terms of the permit.
All of UDOT's efforts (including any failings or inadequacies in the
inspections therein) were in furtherance of its regulatory authority over
ABC's permit. There is no evidence that UDOT's conduct was part of its
routine care or maintenance of the road. In fact, the evidence showed exactly
the opposite - UDOT was not working this project; the project was not for
UDOT's benefit; UDOT was involved only pursuant to its regulatory

GO

authority. All of the conduct complained of was for - and only for - the
ongoing permitting process.
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Other precedent also sup.ports immunity. The Supreme Court has held
that an entity may not issue approvals or authorizations to itself or to its
employees to immunize negligent conduct under the Immunity Act. Thayer v.
Wash. Cnty. Sch. Dist., 2012 UT 31,

,r,r 24-25, 285 P.3d 1142.

But here the

undisputed evidence showed that UDOT was not doing any of the
construction or repair work, or otherwise authorizing its own construction.
UDOT's interaction with ABC, as outlined in the plain language of the permit
and the undisputed witness testimony, was that UDOT acted in one capacity
only - that of regulatory oversight over the private party, ABC.
Unlike Thayer, where immunity was denied because it involved a
governmental entity's internal approval or authorization of an employee's
negligent conduct, the undisputed evidence here showed that UDOT's
involvement was in its capacity as regulator of ABC's permit only. This
regulation of a third party is fundamentally different from Thayer's "internal
approval or authorization." Thayer at ,r 11.
In Thayer, the Utah Supreme Court went to great lengths to
differentiate a governmental entity's approval or authorization of its own
work and employees versus that of a private party. And it is the ongoing
approval or authorization of a private party that is at issue here. None of the
evidence suggested that UDOT was approving its own work. Rather, the
24
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undisputed evidence show that everything UDOT did (or failed to do) was
part of administering the permit governing the private party, ABC.

Thayer noted that "all the cases from this state applying the [permit]
exception have done so when the governmental entity was endowed with
regulatory authority to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke authorizations
concerning private conduct." Thayer, 2012 UT 31 at

,r 26. UDOT's conduct

here - be it action or omission - is more like that of the athletic commission
in Moss v. Pete Suazo Utah Athletic Comm'n, 2007 UT 99, 175 P.3d 1042, and
unlike that of the school district officials in Thayer. UDOT did not create the
dangerous condition. UDOT's decision was not an internal decision, but
directly within the context of administering the permit regulating another
party. Like the government entity's decision in Suazo, all of UDOT's conduct
here "concerned [its] licensing authority." Thayer, 2012 UT 31 at ,r 19
(discussing Suazo, 2007 UT 99 at ,r 15). Likewise, as with the regulating
entity in Suazo, UDOT's authority to revoke ABC's permission is
"indistinguishable from a licensing decision" and "[t]he essential element of
such a decision continues to be whether to retract governmental
authorization of private activity." Thayer, 2012 UT 31 at ,r 19 (discussing

Suazo, 2007 UT 99 at ,r 19).

V!P
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Likewise, UDOT's permit authority here is similar·to Gillman v.

Department of Financial Institutions, 782 P.2d 506 (Utah 1989), where
immunity was upheld. As the Supreme Court later explained, the plaintiff in

Gillman "brought a negligence action against the state's Department of
Financial Institutions for failure to properly regulate financial bodies."

Thayer, 2012 UT 31 at ,r 20 (discussing Gillman, 782 P.3d at 511). The
Gillman Court held that "the department retained immunity under the
[permit] [e]xception because the alleged injury arose from the licensing
decisions of the department, which had the statutory authority to regulate
and issue licenses to financial institutions." Thayer, 2012 UT 31 at ,r 20
(discussing Gillman, 782 P.2d at 511). Likewise, in Debry v. Salt Lake Cnty.,
835 P.2d 981, 986 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), this Court applied the permit
exception to allegations of the county's "failure to conduct inspections, failure
to issue permits, and issuance of a temporary certificate of occupancy."
Like the alleged failure in Gillman to properly regulate financial
bodies, the claims here against UDOT are essentially that UDOT failed to
properly regulate ABC's construction project - to improperly regulate the
statutory grant of authority it gave ABC under the permit. And like the
county's alleged failure in Debry to conduct inspections or improperly issue a
temporary certificate of occupancy, the Trues allege here that UDOT
26
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..
improperly issued the permit in the first place (because it had an inadequate
traffic control plan) and then negligently conducted inspections pursuant to
UDOT's regulatory authority. At issue here is the statutorily empowered
regulation of third party conduct, over which UDOT has regulatory authority,
similar to these other cases - and distinctly different from Thayer's internal
authorization of the school personnel's own conduct.
Because the undisputed evidence showed that UDOT's entire
involvement was in its ongoing regulatory capacity over ABC's permit, any
~

act or omission by UDOT is in that capacity as permit-issuer - and it is that
capacity as permit-issuer that is the very "immunity-invoking condition" that
entitles UDOT to immunity. Barneck at il 38. Accordingly, this provides an
alternative ground on which this Court can affirm the grant of summary
judgment.3

3

The district court granted summary judgment on two grounds: inspection
immunity and permit immunity. R. 1270-72; R. 1160 ("UDOT's failure to properly
monitor the traffic control to ensure it was being carried out in accordance with the
traffic control plan is clearly covered by [inspection immunity.] It is also covered by
the permit exception."). The Trues challenge only the permit basis. They do not
challenge inspection immunity as an independent substantive basis for summary
judgment, nor do they challenge the district court's sua sponte consideration of the
issue. "This court will not reverse the ruling of the trial court that rests on
independent alternative grounds where the appellant challenges only one of those
grounds. Butler, 2013 UT App. 30 at ,r 28 (citing Republic Outdoor Advert., LC v.
Utah Dep't of Transp., 2011 UT App 198, ,r 32, 258 P.3d 619).
~

27

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Gv

2. UDOT's ongoing regulatory activities in issuing and enforcing the
permit are formal, official acts.
Finally, the district court correctly based permit immunity on UDOT's
formal, official acts in initially issuing the permit and then enforcing the
permit. The inquiry of whether an act is a formal, official act is distinct from

Barneck's causation inquiry, and thus properly before this Court in its own
right. See Thayer, 2012 UT 31 at ,I 13 (noting that the causation language "is
not at issue in the certified question before us" and then analyzing "formal,
official act" independently of the causation language).
In order for permit immunity to apply, the Utah Supreme Court has
held that the government entity invoking immunity must have the
"authority, as a regulatory body, to formally and officially issue, deny,
suspend or revoke the authorizations listed in the [permit immunity]
exception, or similar authorizations." Id. at ,I 8. This Court characterized
this test as containing essentially "two elements": "authority and formality."

Winkler v. Lemieux, 2014 UT App 141, ,I 9, 329 P.3d 849. The Trues concede
that UDOT had statutory authority to issue the permit, and challenge only
whether UDOT's actions can be characterized as formal, official
authorizations. Aplt. Brf. at 13-14.
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But in this challenge, the Trues misstate the holding of Winkler. There
this Court concluded only that the factual record was "insufficient" to support
the district court's conclusion that the government conduct - a construction
flagger's signal to traffic - possessed a level of formality that would have
invoked permit immunity. Winlder, 2014 UT App 141 at

,r 14 (noting that

"the proceedings below did not focus on whether any formality surrounded
the flagger's decision to signal" and the "record thus does not reveal whether
the signal stemmed from any institutional procedure that might have
Qp

imparted formality to it"). This Court did not conclude that UDOT's exercise
of regulatory authority over traffic in a construction zone could never be a
formal, official act, but that UDOT's failure there to "demonstrate formality"
precluded permit immunity. Id. at ,r,r 13-14. Moreover, Winkler involved a
much different situation, a UDOT employee working in a UDOT construction
~

project, not UDOT's issuance and administration of a permit to a third party,
or any omissions arising out of that issuance and administration.
In contrast to Winkler, the undisputed record evidence here
unequivocally showed formality. A statute - making it a class B
misdemeanor to excavate a state highway without a permit - authorized
UDOT to issue the permit to ABC. See Utah Code§ 72-7-102(3) and -102(7).
The statute likewise provided for revocation of the permit. See Utah Code
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.
.
§ 72-7-102(3)(b)(iii). UDOT had an institutional procedure for consideration

and approval of these permits. It likewise had an institutional procedure, as
outlined in the permit itself, for ensuring ongoing compliance with the terms
of the permit - even including revocation of the authorization in cases of
noncompliance. R. 1042. The permit was issued in writing, with detailed
terms setting forth the how, when, and where of the construction project. Id.

~

The permit outlined numerous responsibilities undertaken by ABC in acting
pursuant to the permit's authorization. Id.
The permit likewise set forth institutional procedures for ensuring

~

ABC's continuing compliance with the permits' many restrictions, including
payment by ABC of inspection fees, as well as verbal and, if necessary,

~

written revocation of the authority ABC's to excavate. Id. And the permit
included provisions for dealing with ABC's potential failure or refusal to
complete the project, with provision for reimbursement by ABC to UDOT if
UDOT corrected any deficiencies in the project. Id. Indeed, the permit's
many provisions resemble the formality of a contract. Id. ("By carrying out
the activities allowed by this permit it is conclusive evidence that I [the
permittee] have accepted all provisions, limitations, and restrictions of the
permit and attachments [and] understand and agree to all penalties for
failing to comply with them ....").
~
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Despite Winkler's observation that the boundary between formality and
informality is imprecise, Winkler, 2014 UT App 141 at

iJ 13, all of the

foregoing indicia of formality militate heavily in favor of immunity. UDOT's
permit is exponentially more formal than the informal authorization in

Thayer. With all of its terms, including the imposition of significant financial
consequences for their violation, it is difficult to imagine a more formal and
official act than this detailed document expressly conveying authority to a
private party to excavate a public roadway.
Accordingly, UDOT asks this Court to affirm the district court's
conclusion that the permit was a formal, official act sufficient to invoke
permit immunity.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, UDOT asks that this Court affirm the
district court's grant of summary judgment.
Respectfully submitted this 1st day of March, 201 7.

SEAN REYES
Utah Attorney General
Is J. Clifford Petersen
J. Clifford Petersen
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ADDENDUM I
Letter of June 16, 2015, from UDOT's counsel to the district court, the
True's counsel, and co-defendant's counsel.
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June 16, 2015

Honorable Joseph M. Bean
Second Judicial District Court
2525 Grant Ave.
Ogden, UT 84401
Re:

True v. UDOT, et al.'
Case No. 110903926

Dear Judge Bean:
On June 11 th , following hearinm, you granted UDOT's Motion.for Summary Judgment No.
2 Re: Permit Immunity. On June 12 \ the Utah Supreme Court is·sued an opinion in Barneck v.
UDOT, 2015 UT 50, --- P.3d ----, and decided an issue relevant to UDOT's motjon. The Court
"in a manner repudiat[ed] the but-for standard of causation and held "that an immunity involdng
condition ... must be a proximate of the plaintiffs injuries in order to sustain the reinstatement
of immunity. 11 Id ~12 and 38 (emphasis in original). Attached is a copy of the decision.
11

Although Barne ck narrows the scope of immunity, I believe your ruling remains correct
under the new standard. Nonetheless, if you choose to reconsider the motion, I would like the
opportunity to brief the matter, including the application of the inspection exception.

Assistant Utah Atiorney General
Attorney for UDOT

sac
cc: Francis J. Martin (w/enc)
Joseph J. Joyce (w/enc)

---·----------
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ADDENDUM2
Permit issued by UDOT to ABC, dated May 27, 2009. (R. 1042.)
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ADDENDUM2
Permit issued by UDOT to ABC, dated May 27, 2009. (R. 1042.)
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T-226(6/97)

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

PERMIT
HIGHWAY RIGHT OF WAY

App ID: 31361

Acllvlly: 7P05

Fu.nctlon: 110534

ENCROACHMENT

R1-090534-0

Region 1
Data:
Appllcntlon of:

By;
Address:

Associated Brigham Contraclors Inc.
C.J. Nix, Utility Division Manager
75 Norlh 900 West Brigham City, UT 84302

5/27/2009

Work:(435) 723-6520 Fnx:(435) 723-1182
Work:(435) 723-8520 Fux:(435) 723-1102

la horcby omnlod oubJoct 10: UDOT's Rogulollon~ For lho AC<;Ommooullon ol Ulllltloo on Fodornl Aid ond NO/\ Fodoml-Afd Hlghwuy Righi ol Woy, Rc{J\Jlollono
ror lho Conuor und Protocllon or Slate Highway Al(Vllo ol Woy, Slnndnrd SpeoUlcoUono for Rood om.I Bridge Construction, UDOT Speclf!Clltlons ror l=xcnvnllon
or Gtnlo Highway, SJoto Ocoupollonol S(11-0ty nnd Hanllh LQws, Manunl on Unlrorm Trolllc Control Dovlcos, JnstruoUono to Flaggoro, the upproved plnns, and
nny spocinl Rmllntlons sol forth horoln, permission for the p\Jrposo or lnntoll now water mnln lot O[Jdon City within the rll)hl of way llmlls In lho rollow!ng
looaUons: From 2560 s.10 Midland Or. on 1900 Wost.

Highway 0126

Mlklposl .000

to ,000

ln/noar Ooden, Wobor county

The work pormlt\ed herewllh ohall cornmenoo 6/1/2009 and ahull bo dllloonlly prosocutcd to completion. The worl< shall be cornplotod and all dlGlurbed ,u,racos
or objects mstorp!l on or before 711/2009. In Iha. ovont work la.cornmonOGd undot lhls pormll ~n<l lho pom,11100 lolls or rolusss lo complolo tho work, tho Vlnh
tiop1utmpnt o/TransportnUon mny, or Its electlon, 1111In or olhecwfoe corracl ony ~l:!Uno dellcienclcs al the expense ol and sub{ocl to lmmddlatc payment by
thopermllleo.
·
.. -· ·•·-:"
·
•

s porml\, lho Ruulon
corn,oled. II pennllloe falls 01
slopplno nu or nny p~rt:of tho work.

ll po
Dlroc
re\

ilWh'

1
l!~•;•<".

\ '
' ~~·:111:ii·~wl;,ir.::•:;,:"::r:.1_~,~-,~~•*1.~:,.::.?..;r1~r~•!.~½~'::t-""·'.;t.J.~tit~11;1-••~

vp .."-'~!!~~~:-..'.:"'~~;rtt!,-:-..'?ir.1;r,:.;,:t7(.."~-,t~::f.',"!-: a:.1.;•: : a ..~~,~.:..-.;.-..,;:.~•.:,\•~<:-::",,:-,,r;,,............ .

Spoclol Llmltotlona:
Mlnlm\nn 2' Flowuble Fiil 13 roqulrod undor pnvarnont, Saw cut and tock cool Joints. Replaco asphalt to the exlotlno depth or 7" minimum.
Unlroalod BH3c Courso v/llh 87% cornJ)llollon for U10 lull depth of lho lronch wllh IS' 111Is.
Mucl u11u PG cu,phull. Snw OJ! and tac¥- jolnts. Aspholl roplaco lo ti' minimum wllh 3' llflc.
An lnspuctor rnoy bo roqulrod al pcrmlllec's expen~e, wilh 48 hours nollco. Dy accepting this pormll, I ngroo 10 p3y for Inspection fees.
Ucco$oe Is responslbto for ropalnng ondlo, reoIorIng nny pot1lon al tho rondwny dameaad durlnu con5truollon.
l.Jr.eMno mus1rosIoro r.tiouldor of hlghwny 10 Its orlglnnl or boltorcondlllon. Including rcsoodlno. roplnclno sfc1ewnr.<, lenolng, plpo, culvens or signs
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Pormll Holdor will comply with oUoppllcoblo environm9n1nl lnwa.
Min!m,nn clcplh of !>' 1cquircd.
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oltnohmonta, un~crslond oncl ugroo ro oil ponalUcs for falling to comply with lhom, nnd undorstand rny oblllly lo 1oview o pcun\l und uppllcalJle allaohrnanls .:it
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STEVEN A. COMBE (5456)
Assistant Utah Attorney General
SEAN D. REYES (7969)
Utah Attorney General
Attorneys for UDOT
160 East 300 South~ Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140856
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856
Telephone: (801) 366-0100
Email: scomber«>utah.gov

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THOMAS K. TRUE and
MELISSA L. TRUE,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER GRANTING UDOT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

~

Case No. 110903926

vs.
KRISTI OLESON. KRISTI CROSBIE,
ASSOCIATED BRIGHAM
CONTRACTORS, INC., UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
AND JOHN DOES 1-10, inclusive,

Judge Joseph M. Bean

Defendants.

The above-entitled matter came before the Court on 11 th day of June, 2015, on UDOT's
~

Motion for Summary Judgment No. 2 Re: Permit Immunity. Steven A. Combe, Assistant Utah
Attorney General, appeared on behalf of Defendant UDOT. Francis J. Martin appeared on
behalf of Plaintiffs Thomas and Melissa True. Resh T. Jeffries appeared on behalf of Defendant

~

Kristi Olesen. The Court having carefully reviewed and considered the memoranda and other
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materials submitted by the parties, and having heard and considered the arguments of counsel,
and being fully advised in the premises, rules as follows:

MATERIAL FACTS
The following material facts are either undisputed for purposes of this motion, or no
~

genuine issue exists:
1.

On June 19, 2009, Plaintiff Thomas True was riding his motorcycle southbound

on Midland Drive, with his wife Plaintiff Melissa True riding as a passenger, through the
intersection of 1900 West and Midland Drive, in Ogden, Utah (hereinafter "Intersection").
2.

1900 West is a state highway (SR-126).

3.

As Plaintiffs were proceeding through the Intersection, they were struck by a

truck driven by Defendant Kristi Oleson, who was turning left from eastbound Midland Drive to
northbound 1900 West.
4.

As a result of the collision, Plaintiffs suffered injuries.

5.

At the time of the accident, a construction project (hereinafter "Project") was

underway to install a water main line for Ogden City that went under the Intersection.
6.

Associated Brigham Contractors (hereinafter "ABC") was the general contractor

on the Project.
7.

Because the Project involved "digging or excavating within the right-of-way of

[a] state highway," ABC was required by law to obtain a permit before commencing
construction.

8.

ABC submitted an application to UDOT for a permit.
2
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9.

As part of permit process, ABC was required to submit a traffic control plan that

was approved by UDOT.
10.

ABC submitted a traffic control plan.

11.

UDOT approved the traffic control plan.

12.

UDOT then issued ABC a Highway Right of Way Encroachment Permit

(hereinafter "Permit") for the Project.
13.

The Permit granted ABC permission to encroach on its state highway for purposes

of the Project. The Permit specifically identified the what, when and where of ABC's
authorization. The Permit also provided that "[a]n inspector may be required at permittee's
expense." And, "Permittee shall not perform any work on State Highway right of way beyond
those areas of operation stipulated in this permit."
14.

Claude H. Nix Construction (hereinafter "CHN Construction") was a

subcontractor on the project, hired by ABC to bore beneath railroad tracks in the Intersection.
15.

On the day of the accident, CHN Construction had completed boring work

beneath the Intersection and was tying the water line.
16.

UDOT transportation technician John Bangle was assigned by UDOT to make

inspections of the Project. He regularly inspected the job site and supported ABC in its efforts to
implement and comply with the traffic control plan.
17.

Plaintiffs claim UDOT was negligent by approving an unsafe traffic control plan,

failing to maintain a safe intersection, and by failing to properly monitor the traffic control to
ensure it was being carried out in accordance with the plan.
3
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VD
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing material facts, the Com1 makes the following conclusions of
law:
1.

The Governmental Immunity Act of Utah (hereinafter "Act"), Utah Code Ann.

§ 63G-7-101 thru -904, provides all governmental entities with immunity from suit for any injury
resulting from the exercise of a governmental function unless immunity is waived.
2.

The Utah Supreme Court takes a three-step approach to determine whether a

governmental entity is immune under the Act. Wagner v. State, 2005 UT 54, 112, 122 P.3d 599.
The first step is to decide whether the activity involved is a "governmental function" that is
entitled to blanket immunity under the Act. Id. The second step is to determine whether a
different section of the Act waives immunity, and the third step is to decide whether there is an
exception to the waiver that acts to preserve immunity. Id.
3.

The first two steps are not at issue is this case. It is undisputed the design,

construction, maintenance, security and safety of the state transportation system are
governmental functions. Utah Code Ann. § 72-1-20 I; McCorvey v. Utah Dept. of Transp., 868
P.2d 41, 47 (Utah 1993). And, for purposes of this motion only, UDOT concedes Plaintiffs'
injuries were "proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed
within the scope of employment," for which immunity is generally waived. Utah Code Ann.

§ 63G-7-301(4).
4.

The only issue presented by UDOT' s motion is whether an exception to the

waiver of immunity applies. Section 63G-7-30 I (5) contains numerous circumstances where
4
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immunity is retained, including if an "injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from: ...
(c) the issuance [of] ... any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization;
(d) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or negligent inspection."
5.

The permit exception identified in§ 63G-7-301(5)(c) applies to UDOT's issuance

of the Permit to ABC.
6.

Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-102 states:
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3) and Section 54-4-15, a person
may not:
(a) dig or excavate, within the right-of-way of any state highway,
county road, or city street;
(3)(a) A highway authority having jurisdiction over the right-of-way may
allow excavating, installation of utilities and other facilities or access
under rules made by the highway authority and in compliance with
federal, state, and local law as applicable.
(b )(i) The rules may require a permit for any excavation or installation
and may require a surety bond or other security.
(ii) The application for a permit for excavation or installation on a
state highway shall be accompanied by a fee established under Subsection
(4)(f).
(iii) The permit may be revoked and the surety bond or other security
may be forfeited for cause.

7.

Because the Project involved "digging or excavating within the right-of-way of

[a] state highway," ABC was required by law to first obtain a permit from UDOT before
construction could take place.
8.

UDOT's issuance of the Permit to ABC was a formal official authorization, and

the type of authorization the legislature intended to be an exception to the waiver of immunity.
9.

UDOT is immune with respect to any injury arising out of, in connection with, or

5
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resulting from the issuance of the Permit to ABC.
I 0.

UDOT's approval of an unsafe traffic control plan is definitely related to and

arises out of the issuance of the Permit.

11.

UDOT's failure to properly monitor the traffic control to ensure it was being

carried out in accordance with the traffic control plan is clearly covered by§ 63G-7-301 (5)(d) as

"a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or negligent inspection." It is also
covered by the permit exception.

12.

The issue comes down to whether UDOT failed to maintain the intersection in

and of itself. That is the crux of Judge Lyon's prior ruling, and it is the crux of what is now
before the Court. There is no dispute the Intersection was safe prior to the construction. The
only issue of an unsafe intersection came as a result of UDOT issuing the Permit to ABC to do
the construction.
13.

UDOT owes a general duty of safety. All indications are UDOT complied with

that general duty, except when the Permit came into being. There is no evidence that UDOT
maintained an unsafe Intersection prior to the issuance of the Permit. When the Permit came into
being, that was the only thing that altered the safety of the Intersection. Any unsafe or dangerous
condition of the Intersection, therefore, arose out of, related to, or resulted from UDOT's
issuance of the Permit to ABC.

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1.

UDOT's Motion/or Summary Judgment No. 2 Re: Permit Immunity is hereby
6
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granted.
2.

Plaintiffs' claims that UDOT negligently approved an unsafe traffic control plan,

failed to maintain a safe intersection, and failed to properly monitor the traffic control to ensure
it was being carried out in accordance with the traffic control plan are hereby dismissed, with
prejudice.
Approved as to form:

Isl Francis J Martin
FRANCIS J. MARTIN
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Signed by Steven A. Combe
with permission ofFrancis
J Martin

Isl Resh T. Jeffries
RESH T. JEFFRIES
Attorney for Defendant
Kristi Oleson
Signed by Steven A. Combe
with permission of Resh T. Jeffries
END OF ORDER ---------(Signature at top offirst page)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 2nd day of July, 2015, I caused to be served by U.S. Mail a
true and correct copy of the foregoing Order Granting UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment
No. 2 on the following:

Francis J. Martin
Law Offices of Richard M. Lester
7334 Topanga Canyon Blvd., Suite 200
Canoga Park, CA 91303
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